Measuring Public Value
A competing values approach

A paper for The Work Foundation

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This paper seeks to address the apparently intractable problem of measuring ‘Public Value’ (PV) through the relatively simple device of recognising ‘competing values’ and applying them to the measurement of organisational success in public services.

The ‘Public Value’ approach has fast become an established (if as yet minority) approach to assessing the success (or otherwise) of public services and organisations in the UK, Australia and some other countries. A wide variety of organisations from the BBC to the Scottish Government – including police forces, local authorities, public sports and arts organisations – have adopted some variant of a public value approach. Research in the field is also increasing and various think tanks (e.g., The Work Foundation and IPPR) have become involved. It has also stirred up a lively academic debate.

Two questions invariably arise in discussions with practitioners and policy-makers about ‘Public Value’:

- The first is what is ‘Public Value’ (singular) and is it possible to have a single ‘public value’ in a world of conflicting public values and institutionalised competition between values systems (i.e., through democracy and political parties)?
- The second – which assumes a positive answer to the first question – is how can we measure ‘Public Value’? In particular, even if a single concept of PV can be established, is it not primarily subjective and therefore difficult if not impossible to measure objectively?

This paper will propose that an approach based on the ‘Competing Values Framework’ (CVF) offers a potential answer to both these questions. It will argue that there is no singular PV but multiple public values. The common ‘solutions’ to these multiple values is either aggregation and/or choice – so, for example, political parties represent both aggregation of some values within each party and choice between them.

A CVF approach argues instead for balance between a limited set of fundamental choices or values, none of which can be ignored and all of which have to be satisfied to some extent to achieve excellence in public service.

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1 I am grateful to The Work Foundation for financial and intellectual support in developing this paper.
2. Public value

The idea of ‘Public Value’ has been championed through the work of the Kennedy School’s Mark Moore. His seminal *Creating Public Value* (see Moore, 1995) has been highly influential in current UK debates. In particular the publication by the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit of its own version of PV (Kelly et al., 2004; Kelly and Muers, 2002) was highly influential with a range of public sector policy-makers.

Moore’s original work emphasised three aspects of performance for public agencies:

- Delivering actual services;
- Achieving social outcomes;
- Maintaining trust and legitimacy of the agency.

It was the third of these points which was relatively novel and in many ways offered a counter-balance to the rather narrow ‘economistic’ New Public Management (or at least some version of NPM) which had dominated much of the 1980s and 90s especially in ‘anglo’ countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004).

Trust and legitimacy in public agencies and their activities serves several positive functions – it encourages at the very least compliance and at its best active cooperation and even ‘co-production’ between individual and corporate citizens and state agencies. It legitimises the raising of public funds to carry out collective action projects that the market would not provide. In a more general way it raises social capital by increasing overall levels of trust in society.

Moreover the PV concept outlined an active, strategic, role for non-elected public servants in both defending and developing their services. Moore has not been the only scholar to champion such a role – a number of recent publications have argued in a similar vein – if not using the language of Public Value (eg Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003, Radin, 2006, Radin, 2002, Bryson, 2005, Terry, 2002).

Mark Moore has also tried to produce a more ‘operational’ definition of Public Value in the form of a ‘public value scorecard’ (Moore, 2003) – produced in direct reaction to the private-sector inspired ‘balanced scorecard’ (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) and the latter’s application to public and non-profit organisations.
Moore (see Figure 1) suggests several measures of ‘operational capacity’, alongside measures of ‘support and authorisation’ in a similar approach to that adopted not by the ‘balanced scorecard’ but many quality models such as the ‘Baldrige’ award criteria in the USA or the European Quality (‘Excellence’) model. These approaches have all emphasised both a ‘capacity’ or ‘enabler’ element and also a ‘results’ aspect to assessing performance (see Talbot, 1999 for a discussion of some of these issues).

In what follows we will look at both reforms aimed at organisational capacity (see Section 5) and also at outputs, outcomes or results (see Section 6). Others adopting and adapting the ‘Public Value’ approach have developed a range of factors to measure, including at its most complex the BBC’s Public Value tests.

However what none of these approaches seem to adequately account for is the contradictory and conflicting demands placed upon public agencies. In the next section we discuss this thorny problem.
Figure 1: Mark Moore’s Public Value Framework for Accountability and Performance Management

**Expanding Support and Authorization**
- Funder relations and diversification
- Volunteer roles and relations
- Visibility, legitimacy, with general public
- Relations with government regulators
- Reputation with media
- Credibility with civil society actors

**Building Operational Capacity**
- Organisational outputs
- Productivity and efficiency
- Financial integrity
- Staff morale, capacity, development
- Partner morale, capacity, development
- Organisational learning and innovation

**Creating Public Value**
- Organisational vision, mission
- Strategic goals
- Links among goals, activities, outputs and outcomes
- Range of outcomes
- Activities and outputs that create outcomes

*Source: (Moore, 2003)*
Recently Ipsos MORI, the polling organisation, sought to sum up what it had found about British attitudes across a range of issues during a decade of extensive polling since New Labour came to power in 1997 (Marshall et al., 2007). Their analysis shows consistent patterns in the ‘often contradictory nature of public opinion’ (p5), and indeed Ben Page\(^2\) has gone so far as to describe public attitudes as **cognitively polyphasic** – ie they perceive problems and issues in more than one way simultaneously.

Ipsos MORI’s ‘six oppositions’ in British behaviour and opinions in ‘Blair’s Britain’

**Parent and children v Adult-to-Adult:**
Government is often seen to take a controlling, parental stance which can prompt citizens to react in a recalcitrant way. However, the rise of choice in public services requires citizens to make active and informed decisions and, thus, demands an adult dialogue.

**Individual v Community:**
People increasingly want services that are flexible, responsive and personalised, signs that we are acting as individuals. At the same time, people have a strong affinity to local issues and the opportunities to get involved in communities of association are widening (often through the use of the internet and new technologies).

**Having it all v Tough choices:**
Rising standards and expectations coupled with increasing choice has meant that the ideas of ‘having it all’ and consumption per se are positively valued. But, at the same time, people are becoming more aware of the social and environmental implications their behaviour has, and discussions about our ‘footprint’ on the planet have become commonplace.

**Consumers v Citizens:**
This has been a key debate over the past ten years. While people like the idea of choice in public services in principle, the market implications, such as perceived risk of postcode lotteries, are often unpalatable. People want to be treated like consumers by public services, but also recognise the resource constraints, conscious that, as citizens and tax-payers, they foot the bill.

Small club v Big tent:
This represents two competing schools of thought around the welfare state. The first holds that it should remain all-encompassing and offer support to those that need it; the ‘big tent’. On the other hand, concerns about competition for finite state resources has led others to take a different stance — that welfare should only be granted to those that have earned the right for help.

Turned-off v Clued-up:
This final opposition reflects the fact that while the British are now more savvy and demanding than ever, and certainly more active in voicing their preferences, they are also reluctant to actively participate, frequently cynical about whether they can influence change.

Source: (Marshall et al., 2007)

The authors also note that these six oppositions are probably ‘the 2007 British versions of some eternal conflicts and paradoxes of human societies’ (p60).

In this section of the paper it will be argued that there are indeed some ‘eternal conflicts and paradoxes’ in what the public values and that the ways in which these have been traditionally conceived has been partially misleading to researchers and policy-makers alike.

The idea that there are conflicting views in society about what might constitute ‘the good life’ and how we get to it is nothing new, since such debates have been going for at least the length of recorded history and if not before. In modern parlance this takes the form of democratic pluralism; ‘interest groups’; ‘stakeholders’; and many other forms of approach and theories. They all share the common assumption that different individuals and groups have different interests.

From this perspective the two great achievements of modern human civilisations are democracy and the market – two very different, but complimentary, systems for ‘aggregating demand’, that seek to reach some sort of agreement about resource allocation to satisfy conflicting desires.

The market aggregates demand through the interplay of individual and corporate economic decisions – to buy or not – which iterate through competitive mechanisms to reward those who produce goods and services that enough people want, whilst penalising those who do not
produce enough of what people want, at the right quality and/or price, by driving them out of business.

Democracy aggregates demand through very different mechanisms of coalition building, bargaining, and ultimately voting on how many resources should be devoted to collective action and how, within the public domain, these should be allocated and managed.

Underlying both these institutions is the assumption that people have a set of fairly stable preferences and desires which they seek to achieve through rational choices and actions. What the Ipsos MORI research points to is that individuals do not have stable preferences, or even stable ways of thinking about them, but ‘flip-flop’ between different desires and even ways of thinking about them – in other words ‘cognitive polyphasia’.

There is a developing stream of research and theory which supports the idea that humans and their institutions are fundamentally contradictory in their motivations and actions and, interestingly, these contradictions – I prefer the term paradoxes – only have to be fairly limited in number to produce huge scope for variation. One is reminded here of DNA which uses only four complementary bases – adenine, thymine, cytosine and guanine (ATCG) – to produce all the amazing variety of life on Earth.

Just to take a few examples, relevant work includes: research and theorising about altruistic versus, or rather as well as, ‘rational utility maximisation’ (Le Grand, 2003, Margolis, 1982); their origins in human evolutionary history (Sober and Wilson, 1998, Talbot, 2005); relational models theory (Fiske, 2004, Fiske, 1991); as well as the competing values framework we use in this paper.
The Competing Values Framework (CVF) emerged in the early 1980s from studies of public sector organisational effectiveness conducted at the Institute for Government and Policy Studies, at the State University New York at Albany. It has since evolved and mutated in many forms, but the underlying principles remain constant and extremely useful.

CVF asserts that human organisations are shaped by just two fundamental contradictions – the desire for flexibility and autonomy versus the need for control and stability; and the focus on internal concerns and needs versus responsiveness to the external environment.

**Figure 2: Summary of the CVF approach**

- **Human Relations Theory**
  - Collaborate culture
  - Clan
  - Internal
  - Control culture
  - Hierarchy
  - External
- **Open Systems Theory**
  - Create culture
  - Adhocracy
  - Internal
  - Flexibility
  - Control
  - Market
  - External
  - Producers
  - Directors
  - Regional Goal Theory
  - Open Systems Theory
  - Mentors
  - Facilitators
  - Innovators
  - Brokers
  - Monitors
  - Coordinators
  - Internal Process Theory

Measuring Public Value
The above summary model pulls together some of the main (although by no means all) aspects of CVF.

The two dimensions – flexibility-control and internal-external – produce four quadrants. Working from the centre outwards in the above diagram each quadrant has implications for managerial roles (in the centre), organisational types, and organisational cultures. Each of the quadrants has been embedded in four phases of organisation and management research and theory, which are in the outermost layer.

The absolutely key point about CVF is that this is not an ‘either/or’ model but rather a ‘both/and’ approach.

### CVF Literature

The most well known examples of the CVF approach are in a couple of popular books aimed at managers’ own roles: *Beyond Rational Management* (Quinn, 1988) and *Becoming a Master Manager* (Quinn et al., 2007).

A more theoretical exploration is to be found in *Paradox and Transformation* (Quinn and Cameron, 1988) and the recent *Competing Values Leadership* (Cameron et al., 2006) contains a summary of much of the research base.

Work on organisational culture is developed in *Diagnosing and Changing Organization Culture* (Cameron and Quinn, 2006).

There have also been some interesting explorations of how CVF applies to innovation in organisations: *Leading Innovation* (DeGraff and Quinn, 2007) and *Creativity at Work* (DeGraff and Lawrence, 2002).

A very practical exemplar is given in the account of how the US Nuclear facility at Rocky Flats was cleared up in 10 years rather than the estimated 70 and for $6 bn rather than $36 bn – *Making the Impossible Possible* (Cameron and Lavine, 2006).

An interesting attempt at applying CVF to recent UK governance and policy reforms is to be found in *Modernising Governance* (Newman, 2001).
In other words, every organisation will have some degree of each of the characteristics of each quadrant – whilst some organisations may exhibit stronger tendencies in one direction or another at different times, all will have some element of all four sets of characteristics. (This is a fairly unique approach as in most cases these two-by-two matrices, known as ‘Boston Boxes’ in the trade, are most often used as forced choice ‘either/or’ categorisations.)

If we solely take the cultural aspects of the CVF as an example, data from surveys of a large number of (mainly US) organisations suggests that public administration organisations tend to be strong in the Control quadrant, but much weaker in the other three.

Interestingly, however, a recent large survey of Thai civil servants using the CVF approach found a much higher ‘Collaborate’ quadrant score, whilst the others remained similar to US results. This suggests that the strongly collaborative nature of Thai national culture, with its stress on ‘harmony’ from the Buddhist tradition, is reflected in its public administration culture and, moreover, the research shows it is hard to shift from this basic pattern (Jingjit, 2008).

How does CVF relate to measuring performance? It offers a form of ‘balanced scorecard’ by showing that performance means different things in each competing quadrant but that all are important.

In one of their more recent publications, Cameron and Quinn and colleagues have carried out a very interesting analysis of the performance of top private sector companies using a CVF framework to determine what sorts of competing or contradictory measures of performance are required in each quadrant of the CVF model (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Competing performance measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrant</th>
<th>Measures for quadrant</th>
<th>Proxies used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Gross margin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Asset turnover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compete</td>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>EVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Change in EVA growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create</td>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>Sales growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>Standard deviation of market model errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborate</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Future growth values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Sales/number of employees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Cameron et al., 2006 p95)
Their analysis concludes that the best companies – by market rankings – tend to do well, relatively, in all four quadrants of competing performance measures.

They are not unique in suggesting that highly successful organisations tend to have contradictory or even paradoxical goals – one of the best selling of recent business books *Built to Last* (Collins and Porras, 1994) reached the same conclusion, if using slightly different sets of contradictory goals. Going back even further, what was probably the best selling business book ever, *In Search of Excellence* (Peters and Waterman, 1982), contains a much neglected discussion about the contradictory and paradoxical nature of individuals, organisations and management.

CVF is a highly integrative approach – it not only seeks to integrate contradictory or paradoxical elements within organisations and management through the framework itself but it also integrates vertically different levels of organisations within the same framework – from individuals preferences for relating to one-another, through managerial roles, organisational structuring and culture, up to the basic theories governing organisational life. It applies to leadership and innovation, as well as strategy and operations. So any performance measurement and reporting approach based on CVF would have the advantage of being easy to tie to other aspects of the organisation – something that is not true of many other approaches. In most cases issues of management, leadership, strategy, structure, culture, innovation and performance are treated separately or at most in relation to one or two other factors. CVF is fairly unique in that it brings them all together. This obviously offers huge advantages when it comes to thinking about public sector reform and performance which we will consider in the final chapters of this paper.
Public services reform over the past two decades or more has gone under the rubric of the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM), a phrase most often attributed to a seminal article by Christopher Hood (1991). Since then many researchers have pointed out that there has been a great deal of variation in actual reform programmes (eg OECD, 2005, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Looking back even further, US academic Paul Light identified four ‘tides of reform’ which recurred in efforts in reforming the US federal bureaucracy since 1945 – scientific management; the war on waste; the watchful eye; and liberation management (Light, 1997).

**NPM in the USA – The National Performance Review**

Applying the CVF approach to public management reforms in the USA also produces interesting results. The biggest recent reform effort in the USA is usually associated with the Clinton administration and especially Vice President Gore’s ‘National Performance Review’ (NPR) and later renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government. As the later name suggests, this programme was heavily influenced by the book ‘Reinventing Government’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). However an analysis of the recommendations of the book (see Figure 3) and the final recommendations of the NPR (see Figure 4) suggest that the latter was much more focused on ‘cleaning up the bureaucracy’ than introducing the sort of entrepreneurial government advocated by Osborne and Gaebler.

**Figure 3: CVF – Public Management Reforms – USA – Reinventing Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLLABORATE</th>
<th>CREATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission-driven (not rule driven)</td>
<td>Anticipatory (prevention not cure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results-oriented (outcomes not inputs)</td>
<td>Decentralised (hierarchy to networks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-owned (empowering)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTROL</th>
<th>COMPETE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Competitive (earning not spending)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprising (earning not spending)</td>
<td>Market-oriented (leveraging change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-oriented (leveraging change)</td>
<td>Catalytic (steering not rowing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalytic (steering not rowing)</td>
<td>Customer-driven (not ‘producer capture’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer-driven (not ‘producer capture’)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on ‘Reinventing Government’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992)*
Figure 4: CVF – Public Management Reforms – USA – National Performance Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLLABORATE</th>
<th>CREATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empowering employees to get results</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTROL</th>
<th>COMPETE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cutting red tape</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting back to basics</td>
<td>Putting customers first</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Gore and National Performance Review (1993)

NPM in the UK

Similarly, UK academics have identified four separate trends within what has been lumped together as ‘NPM’ in the UK (Ferlie et al., 1996) (see Figure 5 below).

Figure 5: CVF – Varieties of NPM in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLLABORATE</th>
<th>CREATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In search of excellence</td>
<td>Public service orientation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTROL</th>
<th>COMPETE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Downsizing &amp; decentralisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Ferlie et al (1996)

The four categories of NPM do not exactly fit onto the CV framework – some aspects of ‘decentralisation’, for example, were more about cleaning up the bureaucracy and reinstating proper levels of delegation than anything more radical. Nevertheless there is a fairly close match overall.
A more detailed analysis of UK reforms over the past three decades would include all the elements listed in Figure 6.

If this were broken down further by political criteria then it would be very noticeable that whilst the Conservative Thatcher-Major governments of 1979-1997 tended to concentrate on reforms in the bottom two quadrants, the New Labour Blair-Brown governments of 1997-onwards have pursued reforms in all four quadrants as has been analysed by Janet Newman using a CVF approach (Newman, 2001).

Figure 6: Competing Values Framework – UK Public Management Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexibility</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Collaborate</strong></td>
<td><strong>Create</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Joined-up government'</td>
<td>Participation and consultation (external)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Networks and partnerships</td>
<td>Policy experiments and pilots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation and consultation (internal)</td>
<td>Evidence-based policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission statements</td>
<td>Transparency, FOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Devolution and empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allocative efficiency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Compete</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategy and business planning</td>
<td>Regulatory reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resource controls</td>
<td>Agencification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human resources and Information systems reform</td>
<td>Market type mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service Standards</td>
<td>contracting out and outsourcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance targets</td>
<td>League tables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficiency drives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External audit and inspection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NPM in Ireland

I recently carried out an independent analysis of Irish public sector reforms as part of an OECD study. Using the CVF approach again it was possible to identify the pattern of reforms and conclude that Ireland had concentrated mainly on reforms in the ‘control’ quadrant and made relatively much smaller efforts in the other three quadrants.

Figure 7 CVF and Public Service Reforms – Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Compete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategy and business planning</td>
<td>Quality customer service (to the public)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial management</td>
<td>Regulatory reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human resources management</td>
<td>Agencification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information systems management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance measurement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Collaborate</td>
<td>Create</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality customer service (to government)</td>
<td>Openness, transparency and accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aim of this brief section has been to demonstrate the utility of using a CVF approach to analyse public management reform efforts and understanding more clearly what they are – and are not – focussed on.

It is worth saying that having a ‘balanced’ reform effort – ie efforts in all four quadrants – is not necessarily a good thing. If the tensions and possible trade-offs between different efforts remain unrecognised and unmanaged then having contradictory or paradoxical reforms can prove highly damaging – leading to very destructive conflicts. If they are recognised and managed they can – just possibly – lead to creative tensions. However the latter – as the private sector studies mentioned above tend to demonstrate – is extremely hard to achieve. More often, multiple conflicting initiatives are often characterised as ‘initiativitis’ or producing ‘reform overload’, incoherence and poor alignment of effort.
Applying the competing values approach to ‘Public Value’ yields a way of examining the conflicting public values with which all public agencies have to deal in a coherent and understandable manner.

Figure 8 sets out an initial attempt at mapping what needs to be assessed to produce a rounded picture of the public value contribution of a public agency, using the CVF framework.

**Figure 8 Competing Public Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaborate</th>
<th>Create</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COLLECTIVITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>AUTONOMY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Social outcomes</td>
<td>- Transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Co-production</td>
<td>- Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Social capital and cohesion</td>
<td>- Consultation &amp; participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Partnerships</td>
<td>- Innovation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Compete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>PERSONAL UTILITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reliability &amp; resilience</td>
<td>- Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Service Standards</td>
<td>- Personalisation &amp; flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Equity and due process</td>
<td>- Accessibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Costs &amp; efficiency</td>
<td>- Relative Quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The key elements to this approach would be to what extent does public agency X satisfy the public on these five dimensions:

1. Trust and legitimacy?
2. Collectivity?
3. Security?
4. Personal Utility?
5. Autonomy?
Trust and legitimacy is placed at the top of this list deliberately, in line with the Public Value approach, because without it none of the others are possible. It is also placed in the centre of this diagrammatic representation because trust and legitimacy is expressed differently in each of the four quadrants. Moreover it is only by maintaining a balanced approach to satisfying public demands in each of the four quadrants that trust and legitimacy can be maintained – tilting too far in any one direction will tend to undermine overall trust in the public domain and the specific agency. Too much emphasis on ‘security’ aspects, for example, could tend to undermine any of the other three.

Measures of general trust and legitimacy in an agency might be derived from:

- Stakeholder, user and public surveys;
- Analysis of audits and inspections;
- Levels of complaints.

Collectivity refers to those more altruistic values of public and communal interest that the public aspire to without necessarily being of direct benefit to any particular individual. For example, people may want to see social outcomes such as a well-educated society, even though they themselves are already well-educated and would not derive any direct personal benefit from such an outcome. Or they might favour a reduction in child poverty, even though, again, they and their families would not directly benefit.

Measures of collectivity might include:

- Measures of specific social outcomes for which an agency is responsible – eg education, child poverty, etc;
- Measures of active co-production by users of services – eg engagement in sporting activity for Sport England;
- General measures of social capital and social cohesion (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000) and of specific community actions – eg neighbourhood watch schemes for policing agencies;
- Measures of effective partnership working.
Security here refers to the many virtues of traditional public administration and dare we say bureaucracy – reliability, consistency in standards, equity and due process and controlling costs and efficiency (bureaucracy is actually a relatively efficient system) (Du Gay, 2000, Goodsell, 1994, Wilson, 1989).

To take a topical case – citizens hand over personal data to the state for a wide variety of reasons and they expect that good public bureaucracies will ensure that information is used impartially and is safe and secure and not ‘lost in the post’. More broadly, public agencies are expected to contribute to an overall sense of security and reliability and to be there when they are needed – for example in emergencies like the floods in the summer of 2007.

Specific measures of security might include:

- Measures of resilience and reliability;
- Measures of service standards, including minimum standards for processing times etc;
- Measures of equity and due process;
- Measures of costs and efficiency.

Personal utility has been the recent focus of much public policy – especially policies directed to choice and personalisation of services. For example, Comprehensive Spending Review 2007 commits the government to:

‘meet rising expectations by matching the standards offered by the best of the private sector, with flexible, personalised, tailored public services that treat people with care, respect personal preferences and appreciate the value of people's time’. (p31)

The underlying values being expressed are those of personal self-interest and comparative advantage – put crudely, ‘what’s in it for me and mine?’ It should be stressed that this is a perfectly legitimate focus for public agencies, but as with the other dimensions of performance, it needs to be balanced against other imperatives. Measures of personal utility might include:

- Measures of the degree of choice available;
- Measures of personalisation and flexibility of services;
- Accessibility of services;
- Relative quality of services (to each other and to similar services in other sectors).
Autonomy here refers to the desire for personal freedom and determination. This includes consultation and participation, which in turn requires complete transparency and accountability in public services. This also includes an element of innovation and creativity – namely that services constantly evolve and transform themselves to meet new needs and changing patterns of preferences.

Measures might include:

- Measures of transparency and freedom of information about services and agencies;
- Measures of accountability of agencies;
- Measures of degrees of consultation and participation in shaping services;
- Measures of innovation in services.

The above is a very provisional list of both areas of focus and specific issues and measures. The main point here is to emphasise – as indeed Quinn, Cameron and colleagues have done for the private sector (Cameron et al., 2006 Chapter 6) – that there are competing and in some ways conflicting foci for performance and public value creation.

This is probably best illustrated by example. The issue of the terrorist threat within the UK is a useful one – the challenges posed by this threat for criminal justice agencies are complex and contradictory:

- A security focus requires that the government and public agencies deter, detect and where possible eliminate terrorist threats (at reasonable cost).
- An autonomy focus requires that government and public agencies actions against terrorism are accountable, transparent (in so far as this is possible) and do not intrude unduly into an individuals person liberties.
- A collective focus requires that social cohesion is enhanced rather than undermined through anti-terrorist actions and that citizens’ are engaged in ‘co-production’ by collaborating against terrorist threats.
- A personal utility focus requires that individuals are as far as possible not unduly inconvenienced by security measures (eg long delays at airports).
• And finally a trust and legitimacy focus is essential to ensuring that the public – collectively and individually – trusts the state, public agencies and each other to engage fairly and democratically in meeting the threat of terrorism.

It is fairly obvious from this that some of these objectives clash – for example tight security at airports ensures delays unless large extra resources are deployed, which costs money; stringent security checks on passengers can lead to unwarranted infringements of privacy; etc etc.

On one level public managers and leaders know that these sorts of trade-offs, balancing-acts and paradoxes are the very stuff of political and administrative work in a democratic society. What taking a CVF-based approach does is allow us to systematise our understanding of these problematic issues and surface them for debate and judgement.

It also suggests that any ‘solution’ or performance measure which drives too far in any one direction is likely to provoke an equal and opposite reaction at some point. This is not to suggest that a perfect balance has to be struck at all times – in different contexts, cultures and situations a specific configuration may be appropriate and this may change over time. As Mark Moore has emphasised, Public Value is less a destination than a permanently on-going process of creation and re-creation.
This has been a very tentative attempt to suggest a way in which a ‘Public Value’ and a ‘competing values’ approach might be synthesised into an approach which could give some real purchase on the problem of ‘measuring public value’. It is very much a ‘work in progress’ and needs a great deal more elaboration and discussion.

Some of the suggested areas of measurement in the previous chapter are relatively new and would require considerable effort to operationalise. But before getting to that stage, it is necessary to have a clearer understanding of what it is we need to measure to identify ‘public value’. This was the main intention of this paper.

Too much of public debate about the general benefit – or otherwise – of the public domain has tended to be skewed by ideas emanating from rational choice and public choice theories in recent years. They are, to quote the title of a recent physics book ‘not even wrong’. That is they deal only with one of the foci in a CVF-based approach, that which is in the bottom-left ‘compete’ quadrant. Whilst ‘Public Value’ offers a starting point for redressing the balance, I would argue strongly that it needs grounding in a theory of organising, and indeed in a theory of human nature, which CVF and related theories offer.

I would like to conclude by thanking the numerous public managers who have helped me in developing these ideas. I am sometimes told not to get ‘too theoretical’ when talking to practitioner audiences, and once or twice organisers of events I have been speaking at have been somewhat aghast that I propose to talk about seemingly highly theoretical issues such as those discussed above. On the contrary, the most lively and engaging debates I have had with practitioners have occurred when discussing CVF and broadly related approaches to understanding the paradoxes of social, organisational and public life. In my experience practitioners ‘get it’ very quickly indeed and usually breath a sigh of relief when they can see that the daily dilemmas, contradictions and paradoxes they struggle with have a perfectly rational explanation.
8. References


References

References


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